Introduction
In 1986, Martha Nussbaum developed her well-known argument of the socalled 'fragility of goodness' (Nussbaum 1986 ). According to her reading of Aristotle's theory of eudaimonia (meaning 'human flourishing', an enlarged view of 'happiness'), the pursuit of the good life, which ultimately leads to happiness, is doomed to be subject to the will of fate. Since, in fact, one of the constitutive elements of such an enterprise is the possibility of building meaningful interpersonal relationships, and the quality of such relationships is necessarily a function of others' behaviour and such a behaviour is, in turn, out of the control of the subject itself, our own happiness is ultimately in others' hands. That is one of the reasons why our own happiness has always been so strongly perceived as related to luck.
However, a critical point in Nussbaum's argument is that, while ego can only decide to open his/her life to the influence of alter before knowing whether such an influence will be positive or negative, that is to expose him/herself to the risk of opportunism, at the same time, it is implicitly assumed that such trustful behaviour does not change in any respect the quality of the relationship, that is that alter's preferences are stable over time and unresponsive to ego's own actions.
In this chapter I shall challenge such an assumption by arguing that most of the time real people are indeed responsive to others' behaviour and that is particularly evident in the domain of fiduciary relationships. The basic idea is that trustful actions tend to elicit trustworthy responses. That mechanism finds its roots in what Smith (1759 Smith ( [1976 ) defined as an innate desire for the good opinion of other, which produces a certain tendency to fulfil certain expectations that a given class of behaviours (that is, trustfulness) may credibly signal. I shall call such a mechanism 'trust responsiveness', and this chapter will examine the results of an experiment designed to test its empirical relevance.
Section 2 discusses the relationship between trust and happiness in relation to the problem of the agent's responsiveness. The 'phenomenon of trust' and the relevant empirical evidence is, then, framed in gametheoretical terms in Section 3. From that discussion it will emerge how such evidence may in principle be accounted for by many different theories, besides trust responsiveness: altruism, inequity aversion, team thinking and reciprocity (Section 4). The experimental design described in has been conceived to discriminate between the observational implications of the various theories. The data are reported and discussed in Sections 9 and 10, and Section 11 concludes.
Happiness and Trust
The relation that binds happiness and trust is very well expressed by Bernard Williams: 'What is great is fragile and what is necessary may well be destructive ' (1981: 202) . If we have to trust Aristotle, happiness springs from a 'good life' and such a good life has among its most important ingredients others' friendship. A happy person is a person with friends, because a genuine friendship (philia) is the cradle of our own virtues. But, as we know, a meaningful interpersonal relationship includes freedom of action and the impossibility of controlling others' actions, some of which could, therefore, turn out to be harmful for the individual, thus thwarting the person's aspiration to happiness.
Thus arises the central paradox of happiness: happiness is a social product but by living a social life the individual is exposed to the, not always beneficial, will of others.
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This paradox represents the essence of the Greek tragedy tradition. Consider, for example, Sophocles' Antigone. In the darkest hour of the story, near the end, when the action (read: the human condition) seems to be paralysed, a feeble ray of hope comes from an old blind man, Tiresia, and his young friend. They are the only moving actors on the scene, even though their moving appears to be contrary to any logic because the youth does not know where to go and the old man does not know how. The latter needs the youth's eyes and the former needs the old man's experience. They can only survive because of their mutual trust. Therein lies an intimation of the understanding of the paradox of happiness if we try to unfold the dynamics of such an interaction.
But how can reciprocal trust constitute the way out of the paradox when it is well known that the trust may be painfully betrayed? And in fact, this is why Nussbaum (1986) considers that a good and happy life is within reach, but ultimately, extremely fragile. Her argument rests on an implicit assumption of agents' preferences, namely that agents' preferences are stable and unresponsive. Behind such an assumption there is the (implicit, I think) acceptance that the mechanism that generates people's behaviour is the same in both parametric and strategic choice problems, which is, on closer scrutiny, the same core assumption of classical game theory.
However, such an assumption is empirically ungrounded and I shall challenge it by considering the implications of the possibility that agents' preferences are responsive, that is, endogenously generated in an interpersonal relationship. This implies that choices in a parametric or a strategic environment are guided by different motivational mechanisms.
Before expanding that idea further I shall first consider in more formal terms the relationship between Tiresia and his young friend, which I take as an icon of the problem of trust.
The semantics of trust
A brief glance at the recent literature on the topic of trust, shows that there is a heterogeneity of meanings and usages of the terms 'trust', 'trustful' and 'trustworthy'. My particular treatment of the term 'trust' will essentially be a concept that implies the following elements characterizing the behaviours open to agents involved in a fiduciary interaction:
1. potential negative consequences; 2. risk of opportunism; and 3. lack of control.
Consider the relationship between the old blind man, Tiresia, and the young boy in Antigone. That situation possesses all three elements mentioned above. The relationship is symmetric and by entering into it, each of the agents exposes himself to the risk of opportunistic behaviour which emerges because of the imperfect control that can be exerted on each other's actions. The potential negative consequences refers to the fact that entering a trustful action may lead to outcomes both better and worse than those attainable in isolation. All these elements are summarized in the 'trust game' (TG) depicted in Figure 15 .1:
• point 1 is described by bϽa; • point 2 depends on being eϾf; and • point 3 is obtained by modelling the game as a non-cooperative, twostage sequential game.
Player A chooses first either L or R; in choosing L, players get a payoff pair equal to (a, d) . But if A chooses R, the choice passes to B, who, in turn, can choose either L or R. In the first case B gets e and A, b; in the second case B gets f and A gets c.
Given such a payoff matrix and the relations between its elements, the game-theoretical advice for a rational course of action will be for A to choose L and stop the game there. A's reasoning goes backward as follows: 'If I play R, B will play L (because by doing so, B gets eϾf) and I would get b which is the worst of all possible outcomes [from A's perspective]; therefore in playing L, if not c, at least I can get a, which is better than b'. Although A's preferred outcome in this game would be that described by (c, f), such a situation is not an equilibrium outcome and, in fact, it is achievable only when both player A deviates from his/her individually rational course of action L choosing R, and player B renounces his/her rational strategy L, by opting for R. On the contrary, the rational strategy that emerges by backward induction is described by the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 2 which yields the outcome (a, d). If an out-of-equilibrium pair of strategies like (R, R) is selected, we would say that A trusts B (not to be opportunistic) and that, on the other side, B repays such a trust by behaving in a non-opportunistic way.
The definitional problem at this stage can be confronted only at a behavioural level. It is important to give a clear characterization of trustful and trustworthy behaviours and that is only possible by referring to observational considerations.
Formally, subject A's behaviour is trustful when: (i) in a situation that can be modelled as a TG; and (ii) player A plays R. Correspondingly B's behaviour is trustworthy when: (i) and (ii) apply, and (iii) player B plays R.
The strategies described in (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted, respectively, as trustful and trustworthy because the former implies that player A exposes him/herself to the risk of B's opportunistic behaviour, and the
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Figure 15.1 The trust game: the basic elements of a trusting interaction
latter implies that player B's choice attributes to A, a payoff greater than he/she would have got by playing an equilibrium strategy.
Theory and evidence
In situations like that described by the trust game, standard game theory suggests a course of action that leads to suboptimal outcomes. Nevertheless, in a number of experimental situations 3 a different pattern of behaviour emerges. A significant number of As, in fact, prefer to give to the move Bs by playing R, and a significant number of Bs resist the temptation of the opportunistic choice (L) by playing R. Such a combination of behaviours (A chooses R and B chooses R) may be described as trustful and trustworthy (T&T). These 'anomalous' behaviours cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by traditional theories 4 based on self-interest, the role of reputation, bounded rationality, or on the re-description (cognitive or revealed preferences type) of the payoffs in the game.
In what follows I shall focus on models that assume that players are motivated not only by their self-interest but also by some form of otherregarding considerations. In some of the models such additional elements are introduced into an extended utility function that the players aim at maximizing in the usual way. Such models may be defined as 'consequentialist', since in fact, players' choices are orientated only by their consequences. On the other hand, other models develop new solution concepts that formalize an agent actuated not only by the outcomes of his/her choices but also by the way such consequences are attained. These models can thus be defined as 'procedural'. In the former class are models based on the idea of altruism and inequity aversion, while the latter are built around the ideas of reciprocity, team thinking and trust responsiveness. These models are relevant for the present discussion because, in one way or another, they are all able to rationalize a sequence of T&T behaviours.
Tiresia's and his young friend's cooperative behaviour may arise for a number of reasons: for instance, from their both being altruists and each concerned about the other's welfare. But they may also be bound together by their sense of reciprocity: because one is being kind to the other, the latter reciprocates and is kind in turn. A third explanation may be based on the agents' taste for equality. They are both in need and aim at improving their condition but this is done without, contextually, increasing the 'distance' between them. A fourth possibility may be that the two agents tend to identify themselves as a team and to act according to a plan that the team wants to pursue. A fifth and final explanation for the two agents' behaviour relies on the effect that a manifest reliance may exert in motivating trustworthiness. Indeed, it is likely that many more alternative explanations can be developed to rationalize Tiresia's and his friend's conduct, but I shall confine my discussion to the fifth, because this has already been formalized in well-known game-theoretical models.
My manifest preference is for the principle of trust responsiveness, which I think provides the most satisfactory picture of what is going on between the two characters in Antigone and in general in any trusting relationship. A first reason lies in the fact that, as empirically established (Falk and Fischbacher 1999) , people are interested not only in the outcome of their choices, but also in the process chosen to produce certain consequences. This consideration leads us to favour the procedural theories over the consequentialist ones. Second, I suspect that Tiresia's and his friend's behaviour is motivated by something more pristine and unconditional, rather than mere reciprocity or team membership. While these reasons may be somehow plausible, it is ultimately an empirical issue. All five theories are, in fact, empirically equivalent: they are all consistent with observing both A and B playing R in a trust game.
My next step will be to develop a test capable of discriminating between all the alternative behavioural principles, and to do that I shall first briefly sketch the arguments underlying each of the models.
Altruism
In the first model I consider here, the agent is motivated by altruistic concerns. An altruistic subject can be defined as one whose utility increases as others' welfare 5 increases, and decreases as others' welfare decreases. Since altruistic agents are self-centred agents, such variations are usually weighted in a way that ego attributes more importance to his/her own utility relative to that of alter.
In formalizing that principle I follow Margolis (1982) , who simply introduces an other-regarding factor into the traditional utility function. This allows me to draw observable and testable predictions. 6 In a TG, if B is motivated strongly enough by altruism, then it could be rational for him/her to resist the opportunistic choice of L and play R. In so doing, in fact, B will benefit from an indirect increase in utility deriving from the increase of A's utility. With such an altruistic attitude, it becomes rational for A to be trustful by playing R.
It is worth noting that such a class of models is based on a purely forward-looking logic, as players are motivated exclusively by the consequences their actions would produce and not by others' choice.
Inequity aversion
Another class of theories that can be used to explain the evidence at issue is based on the idea of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) . Agents are inequity averse when they are endowed
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This kind of theory can explain the choice of (R, R) in games like the TG, provided that the weight attached to inequity considerations is strong enough, because player B is motivated to play R in order to determine a situation (c, f) which is less unequal than the alternative one (b, e).
As for theories of altruism, in inequity aversion-based theories, agents are forward looking, that is, they are motivated exclusively by the features of the outcomes that their action could determine.
Team thinking
While the two classes of theories based on altruism and inequity aversion described above represent a sophistication of the traditional theory of games, but ultimately are based on minor departures from its basic structure, the following theories discharge some of the core assumptions of traditional game theory. While the two former principles affect subjects' preference orderings, but the agents continue to be instrumentally rational and choose actions that bring about their most preferred outcome, switching to team thinking implies for the subjects a kind of preference and reasoning that cannot be described within the traditional framework of instrumental rationality. In particular, what is radically different is the connection existing between preferences and actions, that is, the way the former determine the latter.
This theory embodies a model of agents that perceive themselves as members of a team. 7 Such membership implies the existence of particular kinds of preferences, namely 'team preferences' . While altruism and other theories affect the preference formation process, the theories of team thinking postulate a different, non-instrumentally rational, way of satisfying team preferences.
In these theories (Sugden 1993; Bacharach 1999) , agents choose a course of action that, although it may appear as non-instrumentally rational, constitutes, nevertheless, 'their part' in satisfying the preferences of the group they identify with. In these theories the agent, in fact, undertakes a course of action that despite not being individually optimal, represents his/her part in the combination of actions that is best for the team, provided that all the other members follow the same reasoning style.
The most crucial and distinctive feature of team-thinking reasoning is how utility determines individual action. While agents are instrumentally rational when they pursue actions that lead to the maximization of their individual utility, team thinkers are considered rational when they choose actions that are part of the team plan, despite their property of leading to individually optimal outcomes. This is somehow puzzling, but for a team thinker, collective good outcomes are reasons for actions by the team, but not reasons for actions by individual agents; for individual agents, they are contingent consequences of good plans.
Given such a criterion of rationality we may expect that if in the TG the two players A and B perceive themselves as belonging to the same group, what will become crucial therefore, is no longer the maximization of the individual utility of each subject but choosing the actions that are perceived as a part of the team plan to achieve the team objective. If the team objective is to gain as much as it can, 8 in a 2-player game like the TG, the goal of the team could be operationalized as the maximization of an increasing and symmetric function of the payoffs of the two players. 9 For the members of a team the strategies (R, R) are the best choice because the B player also contributes to the team objective, in the same way as an out-of-condition football player would choose to relinquish his/her place in the final match to a team-mate who is in better shape.
Reciprocity
Another well-known class of theories that can be used as an explanation of the phenomenon of trust is that based on the idea of reciprocity. Such theories incorporate the idea that agents are willing to sacrifice part of their material wealth in order to be kind to those who have shown kindness to them and to punish those who have been mean. Reciprocity has been formalized in different ways. We shall focus here on the pioneering work of Matthew Rabin (1993) . In Rabin's model, payoffs depend not only on players' actions, as in the classical theory, but also on players' intentions, beliefs and emotions. The games where such factors affect players' behaviour are defined as psychological games.
Consider two players, A and B. In a psychological game, A's ex ante utility depends not only on what A does and what A believes B will do, but also on A's belief about B's belief about what A will do. Rabin uses such a framework to introduce the idea of 'reciprocating fairness' in such a way that players evaluate other players' choices not only on the basis of the payoffs they lead to, but also on the basis of the 'degree of kindness' incorporated in, or manifested by, certain choices. Such a degree of kindness is measured using as a benchmark a particular value called an 'equitable payoff'. When the payoff A actually gets by playing his/her equilibrium strategy is higher (lower) than the equitable payoff, B has been kind (mean) towards A.
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In this framework players' responses depend, via the reciprocating kindness assumption, on the intentions incorporated in each choice, in the sense that the same choice can be assessed (eliciting different responses) depending on the motives or intentions that underlie it. According to Rabin, 'motives can be inferred from a player's choice of strategy from among those choices he has, so which strategy a player could have chosen (but did not) can be as important as which strategy he actually chooses ' (1993: 1289) .
Players aim to maximize a utility function that is made up of a material part and a psychological part. The latter is given by the product between one's own kindness and the belief about the other's kindness. Thus A's being kind (mean) to B, when he/she expects A to be kind (mean), positively contributes to both A's and B's utility, while mixed situations are a source of disutility. One obtains a fairness equilibrium when both players maximize their own utility, given that their first-and second-order expectations about the other's first-and second-order expectations are confirmed in equilibrium.
It is reasonable to think that with respect to the problem of trust, the expectation of a reciprocating behaviour could well be the rationale for behaviours like (R, R) in the TG. And in fact, that is intuitively plausible. But when we consider such a situation more deeply, we see that things are more complicated.
First, Rabin builds a model which is intended only for strategic form, 2-person, complete information games, that is, it is not directly applicable to sequential games like the trust game. In order to do so, some amendments are needed. But there is a second and more substantial flaw that affects the model. Although a pair of strategies (R, R) seems coherent with the logic of reciprocating fairness, it is not a formal implication of the model: it does not constitute a fairness equilibrium.
Therefore to apply Rabin's model to my discussion of trust, the model has to be amended in different respects. Some of these amendments have recently been suggested by Daniel Hausman (1998) , who suggests, in order to overcome the original model's limitations, substituting, as a reference point for the measurement of kindness, the value of the Nash payoff for Rabin's equitable payoff. 10 The intuition behind such an amendment is: 'If you provide a benefit to me in playing your materially self-interested equilibrium strategy, then you are not being kind to me, and there is nothing unfair if I pursue my own material self-interest' (p. 10).
Given such an amendment, A's trustful choice is now perceived by B as incorporating a positive degree of kindness. That would justifies B's trustworthy response.
Trust responsiveness
The last theory I shall examine is based on the idea of 'trust responsiveness', which implies that, given the subject's prior preference structures, the mere fact of being the object of someone's trust, may alter the prior preferences and provide an additional reason to behave trustworthily.
Elsewhere (Pelligra 2005) I have explored at some length the genesis and the functioning of such a mechanism. What is worth noting here, is that the root of such an idea can be traced, through the path of the Scottish Enlightenment, back to Aristotle. At the core of the trust responsiveness mechanism we find two basic elements: first, Aristotle's theory of philia, which considers self-knowledge as a product of a friendly relationship, and second, what Smith considers, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759 Sentiments ( [1976 ), as the most basic motive of social action, that is, the need for recognition, namely, the desire to be loved and approved of. In Smith's own words: Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive. (III, 2.1)
The desire to be praised but also, praiseworthy along with the aversion to being the object of others' resentment, constitutes the ground from which a trustworthy attitude may spring. Consider an interaction like the TG. If we reason forward, assuming our fellow player is rational, and we observe him/her playing trustfully, we may infer that he/she expects, at the end of the day, to get a payoff no worse than he/she would have got playing Nash. The player's actions therefore, may be taken as a signal of his/her expectations. Moreover such a signal is credible because it is costly. The cost being represented, in fact, by the risk of a potential opportunistic and detrimental choice. The player knows that, and he/she knows I know. And I know that he/she knows that I know, and so on.
At this point, assuming that I am endowed with the Smithian social desires, although an opportunistic choice may lead to a higher material payoff, such a choice is necessarily associated with a conscious frustration of the other player's expectations which, in turn, generates psychological disutility. The opposite is true for a trustworthy choice, from which one gets material loss and psychological gain. Therefore, the actual decision will be the epiphenomenon of such an internal struggle between material (wealth generated) and psychological (socially generated) concerns.
Summing up it may be said that:
1. the principle of trust responsiveness assumes that players are sensitive to others' expectations;
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In Pelligra (2003) I have presented a formal model of trust responsiveness based on forward induction and strategies as credible signals of players' expectations. Observationally this model is consistent with a pair of strategies (R, R) being chosen in a TG. So far I have described a set of theories all consistent with a pattern of T&T behaviours. The coexistence of such overlapping explanatory principles need to be somehow disentangled if we have to investigate the empirical relevance of the trust responsiveness hypothesis. To this end it is necessary to design an experiment that allows us to find patterns of behaviour that are both consistent with the trust responsiveness hypothesis and inconsistent with all the other principles.
In what follows, first I describe the different goals of the experimental design, second, the different predictions of each model are formally discussed and tested. The experimental procedure as well as the hypothesis are discussed. Finally the results are presented. The data obtained from the experiment provide support, though not conclusive, for the hypothesis that the trust responsiveness is one motivating factor affecting players' choices in all the classes of games considered.
The experiment: aims
The experimental design has two main features: first, it allows testing for general predictions that, in a given class of games, distinguish trust responsiveness from the other, observationally equivalent theories (discriminative task), and second, it produces highly controlled tests of specific predictions of the trust-responsiveness mechanism (exposure and regret).
Discriminative task
In order to distinguish the functioning of trust responsiveness from the other alternative explanations, I have designed different classes of interactions that imply choices which, if selected, would be inconsistent with each of the alternative models' predictions; that is, to isolate trust responsiveness by blocking explanations based on all the other explanatory principles.
First, the experiment aims to distinguish between reciprocity and trust responsiveness. In order to do so, we compare players' behaviour in two different games (Figures 15.2 and 15.3) . The game depicted in Figure 15 .2 is a usual 'trust game' (TG). While in this game B's non-opportunistic behaviour could be described in terms of reciprocity, aiming to benefit A for his/her beneficial choice of R, in the game depicted in Figure 15 .3, which I call 'the gratuitous trust game' (GTG), B's move cannot be explained in terms of reciprocity: A's choice, in fact, cannot influence B's payoff. If one observes the (R, R) outcome in a GTG game, then the pattern of behaviour cannot be explained in terms of reciprocity. However, this pair of strategies is still consistent with altruism, team thinking, inequity aversion and trust responsiveness.
In order to further discriminate between such alternative explanations, it is possible to devise another situation, which can be described using the game form depicted in Figure 15 .4. In this game, the 'symmetrical trust game' (STG), it can be shown that a B player motivated by inequity aversion or altruism would play L, whereas a B player motivated by team thinking would be indifferent between the two alternatives L or R. Only a B player motivated by trust responsiveness would be consistent in playing R.
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Exposure and regret
The discriminative task is only the first dimension of this experiment which aims to investigate behaviours that all the models, apart from trust responsiveness, would predict would not to occur. To qualify and strengthen that first aspect, the present design allows us to explore two additional factors that may complete the picture of a trust-responsive agent: 'exposure' and 'regret'. In Pelligra (2003) 'exposure'. Exposure describes the magnitude of the risk that A is undertaking by playing R, that is, by being trustful. Such a concept can be operationalized and measured as the difference (a -b) (see Figure 15 .5). Thus, exposure and regret refer to elements that are supposed to affect the trustor's willingness to be trustful and the trustee's willingness to be trustworthy.
Summarizing, the hypotheses are that: H1 A's willingness to be trustful is negatively correlated with exposure; H2 B's willingness to be trustworthy is positively correlated with exposure; H3 B's willingness to be trustworthy is negatively correlated with regret.
It is important to note that while H1 and H2 are merely plausible intuitive hypotheses, 11 H3 is a formal implication of the model of trust responsiveness (Pelligra 2003) .
H1 suggests that the higher the risk of a material loss from being trustful, the lower the trustor's willingness to behave so. H3 suggests that the higher the risk the trustor is undertaking by being trustful, the higher the trustee's willingness not to let him/her down. In order to explore such hypotheses I have designed the experiment around two basic games defined as 'asymmetrical' (Figure 15 .6) and 'symmetrical' (Figure 15.7) , which are different with respect to the payoff structures in the subgame. (5, 9) in both games and for dϭ (5, 9, 10, 11) in the asymmetrical games and dϭ (0, 3, 4, 5) in the symmetrical games. Figure 15 .8 provides a synthetic summary of all the 16 games that can be derived from the two basic structures (asymmetric and symmetric) and the various combinations of a and d. The symmetrical and asymmetrical forms are denoted by 'S' or 'A' and the two numbers that follow are the values that parameters a and d assume in that particular game.
The games can be distinguished along three different dimensions:
1. asymmetric or symmetric (upper and lower part of Figure This allows us to control for three different features:
1. the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is in all games 'A plays L'; 2. the payoff matrix in the subgame remains fixed while varying the other payoffs (a and d); and 3. a and d assume particular values.
The reasons for point 1 are trivial: I want to study 'anomalous' patterns of behaviour. Part 2 allows us to control for all the effects consistent with theories that assume some form of backward-looking reasoning. I am interested in observing subjects' choices when confronted with the same outcomes but different bygones (outside options), that is, B's reaction to A's playing R when A's choice prevents B from evaluating different sets of outcomes. In so doing I am limiting the scope of possible explanations for the effects I may find.
The reason why I have chosen particular ranges of variations for a and d. (point 3) is as follows. Given the two game structures and points 1 and 2, the ranges dϭ (5, 9, 10, 11) for A-games and dϭ (0, 3, 4, 5) in S-games, allow the representation of a wide variety of different situations: cases in which T&T behaviour is mutually beneficial (dϭ (5, 9) in A-games and d ϭ(0, 3) in S-games); cases in which A benefits while B is not affected (dϭ (10) in A-games and dϭ (4) in S-games); and cases in which A benefits while B is slightly harmed (dϭ (11) in A-games and dϭ (5) in S-games). The last cases consider only slight harm because I want 'A plays R' to represent a trustful move, not a presumptuous one. With regard to the range for aϭ (5, 9) , those values represent situations in all the games where for A to be trustful
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Predictions
In the following subsections, I shall discuss the pattern of behaviour that each of the explanatory principles I have been examining predicts for each of the 16 games that I consider in the experiment.
Material self-interest
First we shall consider the hypothesis of materially self-interested behaviour. If the subjects are motivated solely by material self-interest and they believe that the others are being motivated by material self-interest, then the solution for each game can be inferred by standard game-theoretic reasoning: the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, computed by backward induction, which in each of the 16 games corresponds to A choosing L.
Altruism
If agents are motivated by altruistic concerns (and assuming that they give more weight to their own wealth than to other people's) they prefer strategies that assign their opponent more, compared to strategies that give them less. Therefore we should observe B players choosing R in A-games but L in S-games.
Team thinking
In A-games such a theory is consistent with the observation of T&T behaviour, but in S-games we should observe an equal distribution of choices among B's two options, 'play R' and 'play L'. On the contrary, a systematic prevalence of one of the two of B's options would be inconsistent with team thinking.
Inequity aversion
As in the case of altruism, here the other's preferences are taken into account, but to a degree that is lower with respect to ego's preferences; therefore, inequity aversion-based theories predict that in S-games, B players, when called on to play, prefer to play L rather than R.
Reciprocity
Strictly speaking, reciprocity, as formalized in Rabin's model, cannot explain (R, R) in any of the A-games. A is kind to B in (R, R) if 10Ͻa and d Ͻ10. Since what B gets by playing R is always equal or lower than the equitable payoff, A's degree of kindness is alwaysՅ0. This is true for each A-game. However, the conclusion is not very different in the case of S-games. In these games, B's equitable payoff (when he/she expects A to play R) is given by (4ϩ4)/2, except when dϭ5 in the (S, 5, 5) and (S, 9, 5) games (for those last games therefore the conclusion is valid a fortiori). A's kindness is calculated as the difference between 4 and the equitable payoff which is always 0 (or negative in the two games cited above).
Following Hausman (1998) , I shall introduce a minor modification to Rabin's model. This amendment refers to the substitution of the equitable payoff, as a benchmark for kind behaviour, simply with the usual Nash outcome. B's (expected) move has to be considered kind when it contributes to letting A get a payoff higher than that he/she would have got, had B played his/her Nash strategy.
Such a modification allows Rabin's model to be tested using the present experimental design. T&T behaviours are consistent with the prediction of the amended Rabin model as long as f Ͼd, that is as long as the payoff B gets from the trustworthy strategy is greater than that from playing the Nash equilibrium strategy. In this case in fact, when A plays R, his/her kindness to B is nil. Therefore B is motivated to act only by material considerations, and the comparison among payoffs (eϾf in this case) would push him/her towards the opportunistic choice.
When f Յ d, Rabin's model is no longer consistent with the observation of trustworthy choices. When we consider the S-games, we can see that the predictions are similar. The model, in fact, can predict B's trustworthy behaviour only when d Ͻ 4, that is, when B's payoff from playing R is greater than that from playing Nash, otherwise the opportunistic choice is the suggested one. Given all these specifications it is important to bear in mind that I am not testing Rabin's model; what I am actually testing is the principle of reciprocating fairness, as introduced by Rabin but using a slightly different formalization. Such a hybrid model makes precise and unambiguous predictions about subjects' behaviour in all the games we consider in the experiment, which are in the spirit of Rabin's idea of reciprocity .
According to Rabin's concept of reciprocity, we should expect B players to be trustworthy in S-and A-games, as long as the difference between what they get from being trustworthy and what they get from playing Nash, in equilibrium, is positive. The number of trustworthy choices should increase as this difference increases.
Trust responsiveness
Considering the 16 A-and S-games of the experimental design, it is possible to show that the model of trust responsiveness presented in Pelligra (2003) , is consistent with a pattern of (R, R) strategies in all the A-and S-games.
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A further implication of the model is that B's willingness to behave trustworthily should increase as a increases, which is what we shall discover by testing for the exposure effect.
Null hypotheses
The experiment has been devised as a formal test for the idea of trust responsiveness. Such a test refers to general hypotheses about the expected behaviour for each of the alternative principles and specific hypotheses about the functioning of trust responsiveness. The general hypotheses imply a differentiation between trust responsiveness and the other explanatory principles, self-interest, altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion and team thinking, regarding what may be defined as the field of application or degree of generality of each of them.
The general hypotheses refer to a number of situations (games) where a certain kind of behaviour is consistent with trust responsiveness and not with the other principles. The specific hypotheses, on the contrary, refer to specific qualitative predictions of trust responsiveness that may be observed in all the games under consideration. The theories being tested here, provide (a) unconditional and b) qualitative predictions.
Unconditional predictions
We know that the theory of self-interest predicts that B chooses L and (if it is also part of the theory that A believes B to be self-interested) that A chooses L. Given the assumption that each agent weights his/her own payoffs higher than those of others, altruism predicts that B plays L in S-games; inequity aversion predicts that B plays L in S-games; given some extra assumptions about the nature of team preferences, team thinking predicts that B plays L and R with equal probability in S-games. Reciprocity theory makes unconditional predictions for some games but not for others; it predicts that A plays L if f Յ d, but makes no firm prediction if f Ͼ d.
Qualitative predictions
This class of predictions refers to how behaviour will vary across games as the value of some parameter changes. More specifically: all the theories except for self-interest, which does not permit A to play R, predict that 'A plays R' is less frequent as a increases (that is, as A's exposure increases); trust responsiveness predicts that 'B plays R' is more frequent as a increases (that is, as A's exposure increases); I shall also explore the hypothesis that 'B plays R' is less frequent as d increases (that is as B's regret increases).
Experimental procedure
The data were gathered during six sessions involving 134 first-year economics students. The sessions were held in the information technology lab of the School of Economics at the University of Cagliari (Italy) in the period from April to June 2001. The subjects were recruited on a voluntary basis, and were all inexperienced. Given this pool of subjects, while preserving anonymity, the computer program randomly chose pairs of subjects, assigning them a role (A or B) and letting them play one of the 16 games until one of the final nodes was reached. After this, each of the two players of each pair was paired with another player, and they were assigned a new role and a new game to be played.
This process continued until all the possible combinations of players, roles and games were exhausted. The number of combinations was subject to two constraints: players do not play with the same player in the same role twice, and they do not play the same game in the same role twice. We introduced such a rule to avoid any sort of reputation or social pressure effect.
The number of observations of B players' choices was conditional on A players' choices. To maximize the number of observations we used an alternative treatment in which each player played in the B role facing the A players' hypothetical trustful choices. 12 From these two procedures, characterized by one-off situations, anonymity and complete randomization, we extracted from a total of 134 subjects, 95 observations for each of the 16 games considered. In each session each player produced a sequence of choices of variable length (depending on the total number of subjects signed in to each session). One of those choices was selected by the software to be played for real. This is a form of a randomlottery incentive system commonly used in these types of experiment (Cubitt et al. 1998) . No show-up fees were paid for attending the experiment.
Each subject received an average reward of 15,000 old Italian lire (about €7.5, or £5 Sterling). The actual payoffs are represented by the numbers shown at each end-node in the games multiplied by 2000.
Results
The results are numerically and graphically reported in Table 15 .1 and Figures 15.9-10. Data are inconsistent with the general hypotheses based on self-interest, altruism, inequity aversion, team thinking and reciprocity and consistent with the general hypotheses of trust responsiveness.
Consider self-interest (and mutual belief of self-interested behaviour) as embodied by traditional game theory. An inspection of Table 15 .1 and in particular of the values of AR and BR in both A-and S-games, suggests that a non-negligible proportion of both A and B players do not play their self-interested strategies.
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At the same time, the same dataset is inconsistent with the theory of altruism. According to this theory, we should observe in S-games all the B players choosing L; which is clearly not the case here. The same prediction is implied by the inequity-aversion theory.
For the principle of team thinking to be consistent with the data, we should have observed an equal proportion of Bs opting for both L and R, in S-games, which did not happen as formally emerges from A slightly more complicated prediction arises in the case of reciprocity. Such a principle, as we have seen, allows B players to play R as long as f Յ d, and play L for f Ͼd; since we still observe Bs playing R when f Ͼd (as in the case of games (A, 5, 11) and (A, 9, 11)), we cannot consider such a theory to be consistent with our dataset; the reciprocity-based theory does not account for all kinds of behaviour which seem to embody some form of trust.
Consider now trust responsiveness. Consider in particular its unconditional (a-type) and qualitative (b-type) predictions. According to the a-type predictions, we should observe B playing R as a consequence of A having chosen to play R in all 16 games. Moreover, the b-type, qualitative predictions imply that as a increases, the exposure increases, and the number of Bs playing R increases as well.
We also consider the hypothesis (H1) that relates an increase in exposure to a decrease in the number of As who play R.
The effect of exposure on the As' and the Bs' choices is graphically described in Figure 15 .9, for A-and S-games, respectively, as the value of a changes, for given values of d. The Figure shows graphically a strong effect of exposure on As' choices, in the expected direction. As a goes from 5 to 9, the number of As choosing R decreases in both A-and S-games.
Unfortunately the effect of exposure and regret on the Bs' choices is ambiguous. This clearly appears from Figure 15 .10, is confirmed by statistical analysis. 14 
Discussion
The first aim of the experiment was to test for the existence and relevance of trust responsiveness. This was done by testing theoretical predictions not implied by the other theories. The fact that 12-32 per cent of B subjects choose R even when d ϭ 11 (that is, when regret is positive) gives support for trust responsiveness since the null hypothesis is that the predicted effect does not occur. This result is consistent with the findings reported by Dufwemberg and Gneezy (2000) and Bacharach et al. (2001) who strongly support the self-fulfilling quality of trust, namely, trust responsiveness.
However, the second aspect of the experiment, that is, the test for the effect of changes in exposure, and changes in regret, on the frequency of (B plays R), produces ambiguous results. Indeed, we cannot confidently reject the null.
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Conclusions
In this chapter I have discussed the relationship between trust and happiness. Happiness needs trust but trust may lead to betrayal and unhappiness. That is the paradox that led Nussbaum (1986) to argue for the fragility of goodness. In this chapter I suggest that although 'goodness' may be fragile in some respects, it is not as fragile as Nussbaum thinks. If we assume that agents' preferences may be modified during a particular kind of interaction (that is, trustworthiness may be 'activated' by trustfulness), then we should treat those preferences as endogenous.
I tested the empirical relevance of the principle of trust responsiveness that accounts for an agent's desire to fulfil, given certain conditions, others' expectations. Since a trustful action can be 'read' as a signal of an expectation of trustworthiness, the hypothesis of trust responsiveness implies that being the object of others' trust is in itself an additional reason for a trustworthy response. The mechanism reduces the risk of opportunism and the fragility of goodness, as Nussbaum intends.
I have provided a definition for trustful and trustworthy behaviours in a particular class of games, the trust games. Several alternative explanatory principles that can account for the empirical evidence have been critically discussed, including the idea of trust responsiveness. The existing evidence was not refined enough to discriminate among all the theories, so to solve this problem I developed a test able to distinguish, in pair-wise comparisons, a field of applicability for each theory.
The results of the experiment are presented and discussed. From the data I have obtained, the principle of trust responsiveness emerges as the one that showing the greatest consistency with all the classes of strategic interactions considered. Such a positive result is partially mitigated by the fact that other implications of the model, namely those related to 'exposure' and 'regret' are in conclusive.
To conclude, let us borrow from Smith again: 'there is a satisfaction in the consciousness of being beloved, which, to a person of delicacy and sensibility, is of more importance to happiness, than all the advantage which he can expect to derive from it ' (1759 [1976] , III, 2.1).
Thus we have come full circle with my general argument, which aims to understand how trust and happiness are so strongly intertwined. Trust is perceived to be crucial for happiness because one cannot be happy in isolation. Second, trust, at least in the narrow sense of trustworthiness that we considered here, seems to be based on the desire to be praised and praiseworthy. Finally, such a desire to be loved, as Smith emphasizes, contributes to happiness both indirectly, by providing reasons for trustworthiness, and directly, by providing fulfilment of one of our most basic needs.
Notes
* I owe a great debt to Michael Bacharach, Luigino Bruni, Mark Chekola, Robert Frank, Benedetto Gui, Shaun Hargreaves-Heap, Robert Sugden and Stefano Zamagni, whose comments and critical remarks, have, on several occasions, helped shape this chapter. I have also benefited from discussions after presentations to audiences in Bologna, Cagliari, Milan, Norwich, Oxford and Padua. The usual disclaimer applies. Financial support from the Regione Autonoma della Sardegna, Fondazione Veritatis Splendor, Bologna and from MURST-University of Padua is gratefully acknowledged. 1. The Greeks before Aristotle saw the struggle for a happy life as the struggle for independence and self-sufficiency, not only with respect to other agents but also because of 'fate'. They considered the quest for happiness as both a strategic and a parametric problem. I shall focus here on only the strategic issue.
The model assumes that an individual's propensity to behave trustworthily comprises a deterministic term, reflecting the effects of the explanatory variables, regret and exposure, and a random error term which includes an individual-specific component. This allows for the possibility that some subjects will be more likely to be trustworthy than others even after controlling for the explanatory variables. In particular, this logit model estimates the probability of observing A or B playing R as a function of the values assumed by regret and exposure.
First, let us consider exposure. We expected ␤ 2 to be negative and the data confirmed such an expectation: the effect of an increase in the value of exposure strongly affects the As' willingness to behave trustfully (that is, to choose R) in both A-and S-games.
Relatively to the Bs' behaviour one should expect ␤ 2 to display a positive sign. The logit shows us that exposure affects the Bs' behaviour only in A-games and that the coefficient's sign is negative, opposite to that expected. At the same time, there seems to be no significant regret effect on the Bs' behaviour.
